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This paper is motivated by the ongoing debate among economists and policy-
makers about the efficiency and other eco-
nomic effects of privatization of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). Our goal is to evalu-
ate what we have learned to date about the 
effects of privatization from the experiences 
during the last fifteen to twenty years in the 
postcommunist (transition) economies and, 
where relevant, China. 
The transition economies—economies in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and in 
the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) that replaced most of the former Soviet
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Union—provide a useful laboratory, hav-
ing experienced major changes in the values 
of many relevant variables as they changed 
their economic system. Unlike most other 
developing countries and until recently also 
China, the transition economies for instance 
did not merely privatize a number of key 
state-owned firms or strive to improve the 
functioning of their legal and institutional 
framework. As may be seen from table 1, they 
carried out a major transformation that made 
the share of private sector in GDP increase 
from extremely low levels to between 60 
percent and 90 percent (see European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development 2007) 
and they instituted from scratch a market-
oriented legal and institutional system. The 
transition economies, therefore, share with 
many other developing countries numer-
ous characteristics associated with “weak” 
institutions, such as poorly conceived and/or 
ineffectively enforced property rights and 
insufficiently developed capital markets (see 
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James 
A. Robinson 2001), but they have carried 
much larger privatization programs than have 
been observed in other developing countries 
and until very recently also in China. One 
can, hence, obtain valuable insights about 
the impact of privatization by focusing on the 
large literature dealing with the transition. It 
is appropriate to undertake a study of this 
type now because it has been nearly twenty 
years since the start of transition so work has 
emerged based on datasets of sufficient size, 
length, and quality to allow the use of more 
sophisticated methods and to address more 
robustly issues of causality.
There has already been one major attempt 
to survey this literature by Simeon Djankov 
and Peter Murrell (2002). Djankov and 
Murrell apply a meta-analysis to the findings 
from a large number of diverse early studies 
of the transition economies (but not China), 
TABLE 1 
Private Sector Share of Gross Domestic Product
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Czech Republic 10 15 30 45 65 70 75 75 75 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
Hungary 25 30 40 50 55 60 70 75 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
Poland 30 40 45 50 55 60 60 65 65 65 70 75 75 75 75 75 75
Slovak Republic 10 15 30 45 55 60 70 75 75 75 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
Slovenia 15 20 30 40 45 50 55 60 60 60 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
Estonia 10 10 25 40 55 65 70 70 70 75 75 75 80 80 80 80 80
Latvia 10 10 25 30 40 55 60 60 65 65 65 65 70 70 70 70 70
Lithuania 10 10 20 35 60 65 70 70 70 70 70 70 75 75 75 75 75
Bulgaria 10 20 25 35 40 50 55 60 65 70 70 70 70 75 75 75 75
Romania 15 25 25 35 40 45 55 60 60 60 60 65 65 65 70 70 70
Russia 5 5 25 40 50 55 60 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 65 65
Ukraine 10 10 10 15 40 45 50 55 55 55 60 60 65 65 65 65 65
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Transition Reports.
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combining—controversially—various indi-
cators of performance into one composite 
measure of restructuring. The early literature 
focuses on the impact on company perfor-
mance of different types of mainly domes-
tic owners—insiders, outsiders, investment 
funds—and is based largely on country-
specific survey datasets that were frequently 
quite small and not necessarily representa-
tive. It does not examine in a major way the 
effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) as 
this remained relatively low until the mid-
1990s in CEE (except for Hungary and the 
Czech Republic) and until the new millen-
nium in the CIS (see Klaus Meyer 1998).
Djankov and Murrell conclude that priva-
tization to outside owners resulted in 50 per-
cent more restructuring than privatization 
to insiders (current managers or workers). 
Privatization to workers had no effect in CEE 
and a negative effect in the CIS. Investment 
funds, foreign ownership, and other block-
holders were found to produce more than 
ten times as much restructuring as diffuse 
individual ownership. Hardening of budgets 
constraints (i.e., curtailing firms’ access to 
formal or informal state subsidies) was also 
found to have a positive effect on restructur-
ing. Among other factors, import competition 
had a positive effect on performance in CEE, 
but a negative effect in the CIS. Djankov and 
Murrell note that overall the impact of priva-
tization on company performance was typi-
cally positive and statistically significant in 
CEE, but statistically insignificant in the CIS. 
They suggest that this could be explained by 
the more widespread occurrence of insider 
ownership after privatization and a weaker 
institutional environment leading to less 
effective governance by outside owners in 
the CIS countries.1 Finally, Djankov and 
Murrell also point out that about one-half of 
1  This was also argued in a short survey by Sergei 
Guriev and William L. Megginson (2007) which related 
the mixed results on the impact of privatization in 
the  studies they surveyed did not take into 
account the endogeneity and selection issues 
associated with changing ownership and firm 
performance, and they urge future research 
to tackle this issue.2
The present study highlights several sig-
nificant shifts of emphasis in the literature in 
recent years. Firstly, as ownership structures 
have evolved, research interest has shifted 
from comparing categories of domestic own-
ers (e.g., insider versus outsider) to domestic 
versus foreign ownership, the performance 
of privatized versus de novo enterprises, and 
with the impact of concentrated versus dis-
persed ownership. Secondly, researchers have 
increasingly noted that policies and institu-
tional development have diverged between 
the CEE and CIS countries, with the former 
increasingly adopting EU rules and joining the 
European Union, and the latter proceeding 
slower in introducing a market friendly legal 
and institutional system. China also began, 
from the mid-1990s, to privatize large former 
state owned firms. Moreover, unlike Djankov 
and Murrell, who had to combine all available 
performance measures together in their meta-
analysis, we are able to distinguish separately 
the impact of privatization on efficiency (total 
factor productivity—TFP), profitability, reve-
nues, and other indicators. Thirdly, an impor-
tant aspect of our approach is to distinguish 
between studies on the basis of their econo-
metric methodology in order to focus atten-
tion on more  credible results. As might be 
expected given the changes in emphasis and 
methodology, and by including a comparison 
 transition economies to the slow progress in microeco-
nomic and legal reform, especially in the CIS countries.
2 Djankov and Murrell’s arguments were developed in 
Megginson (2005). He concludes that “mass” privatization 
often led to disappointing outcomes, perhaps because it 
was frequently associated with insider ownership. Indeed, 
despite their massive privatization programs, because of 
their relatively low levels of development and the wide-
spread use of “voucher privatization,” transition economies 
only generated 5 percent of the total global privatization 
proceeds between 1990 and 2000.
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with China, our conclusions are richer and 
more nuanced, as well as more robust, than 
those available to Djankov and Murrell.
Commencing with the macro studies, we 
find that the results suggest that privatization, 
especially when accompanied by comple-
mentary reforms, may have a positive effect 
on the level of aggregate output or economic 
growth. However, one of the most widely 
debated issues of transition (e.g., János Kornai 
2001), namely the effect on aggregate output 
and growth of rapid privatization (frequently 
accompanied by dispersed ownership) versus 
slower privatization (often with more concen-
trated ownership) remains unresolved.
As to the impact of privatization on the 
level of TFP, we find that, in CEE, the over-
all effect is mostly positive during both the 
early and later transition periods, but that the 
effect of privatization to domestic owners is 
quantitatively much smaller than that to for-
eign owners, and that it is greater in the later 
than earlier transition period. In the CIS, 
privatization to foreign owners yields a posi-
tive or insignificant effect while privatization 
to domestic owners generates a negative or 
insignificant effect. In most instances, the esti-
mated economic effect is smaller in the CIS 
than CEE. Overall, the TFP effect of privati-
zation to domestic owners is weaker than that 
to foreign owners, takes longer to take a hold, 
and, in the CIS, it has been outright negative 
or insignificant. There are as yet no TFP stud-
ies using data from China that employ robust 
methodologies and, perhaps because of this, 
the available papers find diverse results, with 
the effect of nonstate ownership being mostly 
positive but sometimes statistically insignifi-
cant and sometimes negative.
Concentration of ownership is important, 
with majority private ownership having 
mostly positive effects on the level of TFP. 
The overall positive effect is again driven pri-
marily by foreign owned firms. The effect of 
majority domestic private ownership tends to 
be positive but smaller in magnitude. Studies 
that distinguish between privatized SOEs 
and newly created private firms suggest that 
de novo firms are more productive than, or 
at least as productive as, SOEs privatized 
to domestic owners. The effect of employee 
(insider) ownership on the level of TFP is 
found to be mostly statistically insignificant 
or in one case actually positive. Estimates of 
the effects of privatization on TFP growth 
suggest that in CEE privatization had a posi-
tive effect on the rate of change of TFP in 
the early transition period and that the effect 
disappears in the later stage.
The effect of ownership on profitabil-
ity has been estimated mostly in CEE and 
shows a small positive or insignificant effect 
of privatization to domestic or foreign own-
ers on profitability levels in the early as well 
late transformation periods, together with an 
insignificant effect of privatization to domes-
tic and foreign owners on the rate of growth 
of profitability. The effect varies across types 
of ownership, and concentrated domestic pri-
vate ownership, managerial ownership, and, 
to a lesser extent, foreign ownership tend to 
have a positive effect on profitability, while 
state keeping a golden share or concentration 
of worker ownership appear to be unrelated 
to profitability. The studies of private owner-
ship on profit of firms in China vary consid-
erably in terms of methodology sample size 
and findings, with most indicating a positive 
and usually significant effect.
The effect of privatization on the level of 
firm revenues, capturing the effect of privati-
zation on the scale of operation of the firm, is 
mostly strong and positive. In terms of reve-
nue growth, we observe, in CEE, a high posi-
tive effect of privatization to foreign owners 
in the early period and a small effect in the 
later period, as well as an insignificant effect 
of privatization to domestic owners. Overall, 
the studies of CEE and CIS countries indi-
cate that privatization tends to have a positive 
effect on the scale of operation, while studies 
of the effect of private ownership on the rate 
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of change of scale of operations (from CEE, 
the CIS, and China) suggest that this effect 
is not statistically significant except in certain 
categories of ownership.
Estimates of the effect of privatization 
on labor productivity (not controlling for 
the use of others inputs) are similar to the 
TFP results—the effect of privatization is 
primarily positive or insignificant. As in the 
case of TFP, foreign ownership and concen-
trated ownership are found to have a posi-
tive or insignificant effect, while the effects 
of employee and management ownership are 
estimated to be mostly statistically insignifi-
cant. The corresponding studies of firms in 
China yield mostly insignificant estimates of 
the effects of private/nonstate ownership on 
labor productivity.
In terms of the effect of privatization on 
employment, the estimates indicate that there 
is a tendency for privatized firms, especially 
those with foreign owners, to increase or not 
to reduce employment relative to firms with 
state ownership. In general, employee owner-
ship and control do not have a significant effect 
on employment, providing parallel evidence 
to the TFP studies that this form of ownership 
does not result in excess employment.
Studies of the effects of ownership on 
wages find that state ownership is associated 
with lower wages in some countries, such as 
Russia and former Czechoslovakia, but not in 
others, such as Poland. In Russia, where, in 
the 1990s, firms tended to owe wages to their 
workers, SOEs were more likely to exhibit 
wage arrears than firms with domestic and 
foreign private ownership, firms with mixed 
ownership, and de novo firms. 
Studies that have analyzed the effect of 
privatization on other dependent variables 
show that (1) privatization results in higher 
exports and greater efficiency, as measured 
by the cost of inputs relative to sales, Tobin’s 
Q, and degree of soft budget constraints, 
and (2) privatization to foreign firms leads to 
more restructuring and sale of assets, greater 
 likelihood of payment of dividends, and 
smaller likelihood of default on debt. These 
results exhibit a pattern that is in line with 
the above measures of performance. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. We 
discuss the theoretical and institutional issues 
raised by privatization in transition econo-
mies in section 2. We briefly examine the 
macroeconomic evidence about the impact of 
privatization in section 3 before turning to a 
survey of the enterprise-level economics lit-
erature about the impact of privatization on 
different indicators of company performance 
in section 4. We conclude our study in section 
5 with policy-oriented observations.
2. Theoretical and Institutional Issues
In the early 1990s, privatization was widely 
considered one of the keystones of the entire 
transition process. The policy arguments were 
based on successful experience in developed 
economies (e.g., Matthew Bishop and John 
Kay 1988; Aidan R. Vining and Anthony E. 
Boardman 1992), as well as on evidence from 
developed and middle-income countries that 
suggested that privatization improves enter-
prise efficiency (see Megginson and Jeffry 
Netter 2001 for a survey). The so-called 
Washington Consensus emphasized priva-
tization and belief that private ownership 
together with market forces would ensure 
efficient economic performance. Combined 
with price liberalization, freedom from state 
control was seen as the way to bring prices 
into line with opportunity costs and to harden 
budget constraints (see Kornai 1990).
However, it was also often recognized that 
privatization on its own might not be sufficient 
and that systemic changes and policy reforms 
were a prerequisite for successful transition 
(Jan Svejnar 1989; David Lipton and Jeffrey 
Sachs 1990; Olivier Blanchard et al. 1991; 
Philippe Aghion and Blanchard 1994). We 
briefly review the accompanying policy 
reforms and systemic changes as well as the 
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variation in the effectiveness of their imple-
mentation in the first subsection (2.1) below.
The transfer of ownership rights was seen 
by most academics and policymakers as 
being crucial for the efficient allocation of 
resources and economic growth. As a result, 
much empirical work has been related to 
efficiency and in the second subsection (2.2) 
below we therefore survey the efficiency-
related arguments for privatization.3
The large scale of privatization spawned 
considerable variation in privatization meth-
ods. It was suggested at the time that “bad 
privatization methods,” for example so-
called “mass privatization” in which owner-
ship rights were widely dispersed, may lead 
to “bad ownership structures” and therefore 
reduce the potential gains from privatization. 
We evaluate this argument in the third sub-
section (2.3).
In the final subsection (2.4), we consider 
factors likely to influence the selection of 
firms for privatization. The theoretical and 
empirical evidence indicates that firms were 
not chosen to participate in the privatization 
process at random. Hence, empirical esti-
mates that fail to take account of this phe-
nomenon will be biased. The prevalence of 
selection bias leads us to apply stricter cri-
teria than previous surveys with respect to 
econometric methods when we evaluate the 
findings from the empirical literature in the 
final section of the paper.
2.1  Policies in Transition Economies
Privatization in the transition economies 
occurred in the context of broader systemic 
change. In almost all these economies but 
not China (see Lawrence J. Lau, Yingyi Qian, 
3 From a political perspective, however, privatization 
was viewed as being necessary in transition economies, 
even if there were to be no efficiency improvements—the 
reason for privatization was to eradicate the command 
economic system rooted in communist ideology (see 
Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny 1994).
Gerard Roland 2000), governments plunged 
ahead with what Svejnar (2002) calls Type I 
reforms, namely macro stabilization, price lib-
eralization and dismantling of the institutions 
of the communist system. Most countries 
also opened up rapidly to international trade, 
thus inducing a more efficient allocation of 
resources based on world market prices, and 
quickly reduced direct subsidies to SOEs. 
Svejnar’s Type II reforms involved the 
development and enforcement of laws, regu-
lations, and institutions that would ensure a 
successful functioning of a market-oriented 
economy. These reforms included privatiza-
tion and the establishment and enforcement of 
a market-oriented legal system and accompa-
nying institutions able to create well-defined 
property rights, permit the enforcement of 
contracts, and limit corruption. 
According to the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development’s Transition 
Indicators (European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, various years) progress in 
developing a market-supporting legal system 
was everywhere slow, although the pace was 
more rapid in CEE than the CIS in limiting 
corruption and establishing a functioning 
legal framework and institutions. An impor-
tant impetus for implementing legal and insti-
tutional reforms in most countries in Central 
Europe, the Balkans, and the Baltic has been 
the need to develop a system that conforms to 
that of the European Union as a prerequisite 
for accession (Richard E. Baldwin, Joseph F. 
Francois, and Richard Portes 1997).
2.2 Privatization and Efficiency
Historically, SOEs were established to 
ensure political control of production,  better 
provision of public goods, more effective ways 
of dealing with externalities, spearheading 
of economic development in the absence of 
“well functioning” markets, and guarantee-
ing full employment and equitable income 
distribution. The economic  performance of 
705Estrin et al.: The Effects of Privatization and Ownership in Transition Economies
many SOEs has proved disappointing how-
ever and, since the early 1980s, privatization 
has started to be advocated as a means of 
establishing clear property rights, provid-
ing economic incentives, and stimulating 
superior economic performance of firms and 
economies at large (see John Vickers and 
George Yarrow 1988, Bernardo Bortolloti 
and Domenico Siniscalco 2004). One argu-
ment for privatization is that firms under 
central planning are inefficiently large and 
their divestitures, combined with privatiza-
tion, constitute a desirable way to improve 
corporate performance (see Jan Hanousek, 
Evžen Kocˇenda, and Svejnar 2009).4 Another 
argument for privatization stresses the fact 
that the objectives imposed by the state as 
owner in SOEs are not necessarily consistent 
with profit maximization (see Saul Estrin 
and Virginie Perotin 1991). The politiciza-
tion of enterprise decision making may also 
open firms up to lobbying and unproductive 
rent seeking (see Shleifer and Vishny 1994, 
1997).
Even if the state as owner seeks to maxi-
mize the profits of its firms, problems of cor-
porate governance may still lead to inferior 
performance. Outside owners—whether 
private or state—do not have full informa-
tion about corporate performance, so firm-
specific rents may be appropriated by the 
 managers. However, private ownership may 
place more effective constraints on manag-
ers’ discretionary behavior via high-powered 
incentives for managers (Randall Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny 1989) or through the 
4 Hanousek, Kocˇenda, and Svejnar (2009) find that 
divestitures increase the firm’s profitability but do not 
alter its scale of operations, while the effect of privatiza-
tion depends on the resulting ownership structure.
5 A number of theoretical papers have addressed the 
problems raised by the need to induce SOE managers 
to accept privatization (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1994; 
Francesco Cornelli and David D. Li 1997), although in 
practice this turned out not to be a problem. The desire to 
generate widespread political support for privatization in
operation of the market for corporate control 
(Schleifer and Vishny 1997), though if own-
ership is dispersed, owners may face a free 
rider problem in which the individual returns 
to monitoring by each owner are less than the 
costs (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). The weak 
monitoring of managers by the state and the 
absence of external constraints often enabled 
SOE managers to gain discretion and follow 
their own objectives (Estrin 2002).
In much of continental Europe, greater 
emphasis has traditionally been placed on 
bank debt than equity, with governance exer-
cised via board membership of the controlling 
owners. This approach has also developed in 
a number of transition economies. However, 
in many developing economies as well as in 
some developed countries, family and busi-
ness group ownership remains predominant 
and, although the ownership structures are 
typically highly concentrated, this ownership 
form is argued to impair company perfor-
mance relative to outsider ownership struc-
tures (Morck, Daniel Wolfenzon, and Bernard 
Yeung 2005). This is relevant for transition 
economies because privatization, especially 
in the CIS, has led to the emergence of 
diversified business groups owned by indi-
viduals (“oligarchs”). This might explain dif-
ferential performance between CEE and the 
CIS, though preliminary evidence suggests 
that business groups may actually be more 
efficient than other privatized companies in 
Russia and Ukraine (see Guriev and Andrei 
Rachinsky 2005; Yuriy Gorodnichenko and 
Yegor Grygorenko 2008).5
the context of de facto managerial control of  enterprises 
has also been considered. For example, Bruno Biais and 
Enrico Perotti (2002) analyze politically motivated priva-
tization. They find that, when median voters favor redis-
tribution, strategic rationing and underpricing will be 
needed to shift problematic preferences. John Bennett 
and James Maw (2003) and Bennett, Estrin, and Maw 
(2005) also consider underpricing and explain how setting 
a zero price for privatized firms may be a rational strategy, 
even for a revenue maximizing government, provided the 
state also retains some shares in the privatized entity.
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Firms in transition economies also suffered 
the incentive problems caused by the soft-
ness of budget constraints (see Kornai 1990; 
Mathias Dewatripont, Eric Maskin, and 
Roland 2000; Kornai, Maskin, and Roland 
2003), with poorly performing firms often 
being granted easier access to external invest-
ment funds than the better performing ones 
(Lubomír Lízal and Svejnar 2002). This has led 
analysts to stress that the hardening of budget 
constraints should be a priority and could be 
achieved most effectively by breaking the link 
between firms and the state through privati-
zation (Alan A. Bevan, Estrin, and Mark E. 
Schaffer 1999). Moreover, Roman Frydman 
et al. (2000) have argued that the imposition 
of hard budget constraints on SOEs will not 
induce strategic restructuring because entre-
preneurial incentives associated with outside 
investor will still be absent. This relates to the 
incomplete contracts ideas of Oliver D. Hart 
and John Moore (1988) that have been used to 
argue that state managers tend to make rou-
tine decisions whereas private owners would 
engage in nonroutine decisions and stimulate 
entrepreneurship. In the presence of external 
shocks, privatized firms are, hence, thought 
to move more readily into new markets and 
product lines and be less likely to lay off work-
ers than SOEs. This suggests that privatization 
might only be effective when control shifts to 
new owners who are thereby able to change 
the managers. As we discuss below, delayed 
privatization can undermine the performance 
of the SOEs since, in this situation, the incen-
tives of managers become to seize assets or to 
tunnel them out, rather than to improve per-
formance (see Johnson et al. 2000).6
Perhaps the main caveat to the efficiency 
arguments in support of private ownership 
concerns the welfare dilemmas when private 
firms provide public goods and/or have  natural 
monopoly power (Jean-Jacques Laffont and 
Jean Tirole 1993). If firms have monopoly 
power, privatization can be harmful even 
if productive efficiency of a firm increases, 
unless there are adequate regulatory controls 
or sufficiently rapid entry (see also Edward 
L. Glaeser and José A. Scheinkman 1996). 
Monopoly power also creates a dilemma for 
the state as owner in a privatization process; 
firms that are privatized with monopoly 
power can be sold for higher prices than if 
the company is broken up to create a more 
competitive market structure. Similarly, if 
corporate governance provisions for private 
firms are lax, company assets may be sto-
len and misallocated. Monopoly power may, 
hence, explain a divergence between empiri-
cal results concerning profitability and sales 
on the one hand, and TFP on the other.7
2.3  Extent and Methods of Privatization
The fact that the state owned almost 
every industrial firm in socialist economies 
raised questions about how much privatiza-
tion should be undertaken, by what methods, 
and at what rate. In practice, most countries 
decided to privatize a large number of firms 
rather quickly (Estrin 1994) and were, there-
fore, forced to innovate in privatization meth-
ods in order to address the unprecedented 
issues of scale and the political urgency for 
speed. Some authors have suggested that 
Perotti 2002; Shleifer and Vishny 1994). In practice, how-
ever, ownership structures have evolved to become more 
concentrated and the emergence of “oligarchic” business 
groups in the former CIS has probably also exacerbated 
income inequality. Nancy Birdsall and John Nellis (2003) 
survey the impact of privatization on distribution in devel-
oping economies and conclude that privatization programs 
have worsened the distribution of asset ownership, more so 
in transitional economies than Latin America.
6 One can also consider the issue of corporate 
governance from the perspective of employee par-
ticipation in management (see Derek C. Jones 2004).
7 Privatization also has been important for the distribu-
tion of income and wealth. Early analysts favored priva-
tization at reduced prices and open to the population as 
a whole on grounds of equity (Blanchard et al. 1991) and 
models were developed to evaluate the political processes 
balancing distributive and efficiency issues (Biais and
707Estrin et al.: The Effects of Privatization and Ownership in Transition Economies
deficiencies in some of these new methods of 
privatization, notably the widespread use of 
forms of “mass” privatization whereby shares 
are distributed at nominal prices to the pop-
ulation at large, may explain the apparent 
initial deficiencies in the impact of the policy 
(e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz 2002).
The arguments for fast privatization were 
that (1) price liberalization and other reforms 
would not provide sufficient incentives for 
SOEs to restructure and become competi-
tive, (2) the state would not be able to resist 
intervening in SOEs (Frydman and Andrzej 
Rapaczynski 1991; Maxim Boycko, Shleifer, 
and Vishny 1995), and (3) managers (and/
or workers) would decapitalize firms in the 
absence of rapid clarification of property 
rights (Frydman et al. 1993; Blanchard et al. 
1991). In contrast, Dewatripont and Roland 
(1992a, 1992b) and Roland (1994) argue that 
gradual privatization was needed because 
the political backlash to rapid privatization 
of all firms would be unacceptable. In par-
ticular, Dewatripont and Roland’s (1992a, 
1992b) argument for gradualism is that it 
allowed the government to pursue a strategy 
that necessitated fewer workers/voters being 
immediately laid off and that it would reduce 
uncertainty. As we discuss below, how-
ever, empirical evidence shows that in most 
countries privatization did not bring about a 
reduction in employment.
The use of mass privatization did spear-
head a remarkable growth in the private 
sector (table 1).8 However, this achievement 
should not conceal concerns about quality 
of privatization that was undertaken.9 Mass 
8 A hidden outcome of the large-scale property trans-
fers was the creation of lasting state control over assets in 
many privatized firms. The actual extent of privatization, 
especially in the early years of transformation, was there-
fore less than appears from the official statistics. See, e.g., 
Hanousek and Kocˇenda (2008).
9 For example, though retained state shareholdings 
were small in some of the leading transition economies in 
CEE, the state continued to own significant shareholdings 
in others, especially in the CIS. Thus, in a 1999 survey of 
 privatization led to ownership structures that 
were initially highly dispersed because the 
entire adult population of the country, or all 
insiders to each firm, were allocated vouchers 
with which to purchase the shares of the com-
pany. Mass privatization was also argued to 
hinder the establishment of effective corpo-
rate governance, especially when long “agency 
chains” were created by the emergence of 
financial intermediaries holding privatization 
vouchers (John C. Coffee 1996; Stiglitz 2002). 
It probably also hindered the development of 
secondary capital markets and in many coun-
tries it also initially resulted in majority own-
ership by insiders (Estrin 2002).
Whether as a consequence of institutional 
weakness and/or the methods of privatiza-
tion, the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development Transition indicators show 
that capital markets in transition economies 
developed less quickly than other market 
economy structures such as liberalized price 
setting or openness to trade. Indeed, stock 
markets in transition economies during the 
1990s were often characterized by insufficient 
regulation, institutional fragility and weak 
minority shareholder protection (European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
1998; John Bonin and Paul Wachtel 2003).
2.4  Selection of Firms to be Privatized
Whatever the privatization methods used, 
it is likely that firms are not assigned for 
privatization at random. This has important 
implications for econometric work  assessing 
privatized firms, the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development finds that, in twenty of the twenty-three 
countries, the state had retained some shares in around 20 
percent of privatized firms, with more than a 20 percent 
shareholding in around 12 percent of the firms. The state 
kept a share of more than 15 percent of privatized firms in 
eight countries and more than 30 percent in a further four 
(Bennett, Estrin, and Maw 2005). Retained state owner-
ship has been a factor in recent Chinese privatizations 
(Lihui Tian and Estrin 2008). Governments have also 
issued golden shares to retain influence over some of the 
privatized SOEs.
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the impact of privatization on company per-
formance because it implies that studies that 
treat the allocation of firms for privatization 
as random or do not adequately control for 
the nonrandom selection may potentially 
overstate the positive effect of privatization 
on performance. Djankov and Murrell, for 
instance, indicate that 47 percent of pre-
2003 studies that they survey do not control 
for this nonrandom selection.
Realizing this shortcoming, Nandini 
Gupta, John C. Ham, and Svejnar (2008) 
analyze the problem that arises in the studies 
that ignore the fact that better or worse firms 
may be privatized first. They note that there 
may be several reasons why a government 
may choose to sequence the privatization 
of SOEs. First, the government may incur 
excessively high transaction and congestion 
costs if it tries to privatize all firms simulta-
neously. Second, by sequencing it may reveal 
information about the firms to investors (later 
buyers may observe the quality of the firms 
sold earlier) if there is uncertainty about the 
quality of the firms being privatized, or avoid 
political opposition to reforms (Dewatripont 
and Roland 1995). Finally it may want to 
sequence privatization so as to avoid unem-
ployment (Aghion and Blanchard 1994; and 
Barbara G. Katz and Joel Owen 1993).
Gupta, Ham, and Svejnar (2008) consider 
five competing government objectives for 
privatization: (1) maximizing Pareto  efficiency 
through resource allocation, (2) maximizing 
public goodwill from the free transfers of 
shares to the public, (3) minimizing political 
costs stemming from unemployment,10 (4) 
maximizing efficiency through  information 
10 Political configurations can influence the pace 
and timing of privatization, as was found by Bernardo 
Bortolotti and Paolo Pinotti (2003) in their study of 
twenty-one OECD countries over the period 1977–2002. 
In particular, the authors found that political fragmen-
tation gave several groups the opportunity to veto or 
 otherwise block large-scale privatization and, hence, delay 
or even halt the process.
gains, and (5) maximizing privatization rev-
enues. They use firm-level data from the 
Czech Republic to test the competing theo-
retical predictions about the sequencing of 
privatization and find strong evidence that 
the firms the government privatized first 
were more profitable, were firms in down-
stream industries, and in industries subject 
to greater demand uncertainty. Privatizing 
more profitable firms first is hence inconsis-
tent with maximizing Pareto efficiency but it 
is consistent with the model of maximizing 
privatization revenues, maximizing public 
goodwill and minimizing the political cost 
of unemployment. However, the implication 
of the political cost model that employment 
growth in the firm’s industry should affect 
sequencing is not supported by the results. 
Gupta, Ham, and Svejnar’s (2008) finding 
that firms in downstream industries and in 
industries with greater demand uncertainty 
were more likely to be privatized early sug-
gests that the government placed emphasis 
on efficiency in the Glaeser and Scheinkman 
(1996) sense, namely by privatizing first firms 
that required flexible management.11
3. Privatization and Growth
A number of theoretical models provided 
competing predictions about the effects of 
privatization on macroeconomic perfor-
mance and growth. In Thorvaldur Gylfason 
(1998), privatization is shown to increase 
11 Glaeser and Scheinkman (1996) examine sequencing 
strategies that would increase efficiency via informational 
gains. In their model, private firms respond to demand 
and cost shocks, but this information is ignored by pub-
lic firms. The Glaeser–Scheinkman model predicts that 
privatization should begin where demand or cost vola-
tility is the greatest and where it maximizes the flow of 
information. Thus, when demand uncertainty is greater 
than cost uncertainty, the authors argue that downstream 
firms should be privatized before upstream firms because 
downstream firms are better positioned to transmit infor-
mation between the retail and upstream sectors.
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national economic output in a two-sector 
full-employment general-equilibrium model 
by enhancing efficiency as if a relative price 
distortion were being removed through price 
reform, trade liberalization, or stabiliza-
tion. Nico A. Hansen (1997) uses a general 
equilibrium imperfect competition model to 
show that a broad distribution of ownership 
rights can have favorable influence on micro-
economic efficiency.
Several studies use aggregate data to 
assess the effect of privatization on eco-
nomic performance. Using data from thirty-
five developing market economies Patrick 
Plane (1997) finds that privatization (through 
divestiture) has a significant positive effect 
on economic growth and that the effect is 
stronger when privatization takes place in 
industry or infrastructure rather than in 
other sectors. Daniel Berkowitz and David 
N. DeJong (2003) find that regions with 
more large-scale privatization exhibit greater 
formation of new (legally registered) enter-
prises, which in turn exhibits a strong posi-
tive correspondence with growth. Steven 
Barnett (2000) uses macroeconomic and 
privatization data from eighteen countries to 
find that privatization proceeds transferred 
to the budget tend to be saved and used to 
reduce domestic financing. His other main 
finding is that total privatization, as opposed 
to just the proceeds being transferred to the 
budget, is correlated with an improvement 
in macroeconomic performance as mani-
fested by higher real GDP growth and lower 
unemployment. In a cross-country aggregate 
study, Clifford Zinnes, Yair Eilat, and Sachs 
(2001) use a panel data set from twenty-five 
transition countries to find that privatization 
does not by itself increase GDP growth, but 
they suggest that a positive effect is present 
when privatization is accompanied by hard 
budget constraints and in-depth institu-
tional reforms. Bennett, Estrin and Giovanni 
Urga (2007) use a panel data model and 
GMM estimation methods for almost all the 
 transition economies ( twenty-six countries), 
controlling for country or time specific fac-
tors with fixed effects. They do not identify 
a significant relationship between private 
sector share and growth; hence their results 
do not indicate a direct relationship between 
privatization and growth. However, they do 
have results concerning methods of priva-
tization in that they find countries which 
used mass privatization enjoyed significantly 
higher growth postprivatization relative to 
preprivatization, compared with countries 
that used other privatization methods. Their 
study suggests that, the advantage of speed 
in privatization brought about by mass priva-
tization may have yielded long-term ben-
efits in terms of economic growth.12 Using 
similar data, Fabian Gouret (2007) provides 
complementary evidence about the impact 
of privatization methods on growth. He also 
finds a positive effect from mass privatization 
but it is smaller than from the more gradual 
methods of privatization. The difference in 
the results of the two studies stems from 
differences in specification, not completely 
overlapping data sets and the use of different 
estimation methods.
The macro studies, hence, suggest that 
privatization, especially when accompanied 
by complementary reforms, may have a posi-
tive effect on the level of aggregate output 
or economic growth, but the effect of speed, 
and the accompanying dispersed versus more 
concentrated ownership, on aggregate output 
and growth is unclear.
4. The Effects of Privatization on the 
Performance of Firms
Earlier surveys of firm-level studies exam-
ining the effects of privatization on firm 
12 They argue that their result is due to an increase in 
ownership concentration following mass privatization that 
had strengthened control over firms.
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 performance range from ones that find a large 
variation of outcomes but no systematically 
significant effect of privatization on perfor-
mance (Bevan, Estrin, and Schaffer 1999) to 
those cautiously concluding that privatization 
improves firm performance (Megginson and 
Netter 2001), to ones that are fairly confident 
that privatization tends to improve perfor-
mance (Mary M. Shirley and Patrick Walsh 
2000; Djankov and Murrell 2002).
This variation in the interpretation of 
results is brought about in part by the fact 
that the early studies had access to differ-
ent and often somewhat limited data on firm 
performance and ownership. For these rea-
sons, many studies treat ownership as a rela-
tively simple categorical concept and some 
are often unable to distinguish the exact 
extent of ownership by individual owners or 
even relatively homogeneous groups of own-
ers. Equally important, the diversity of inter-
pretations and findings is generated by three 
types of interrelated analytical problems that 
may be expected in early studies in the con-
text of the rapidly changing transition econ-
omies. First, the early studies rely on short 
time periods with observations concentrated 
immediately before and after privatization. 
Second, the early studies (1) use small and 
often unrepresentative samples of firms, (2) 
are frequently unable to identify accurately 
ownership because privatization is still ongo-
ing or because the frequent postprivatization 
changes of ownership are hard to detect, and 
(3) often combine panel data from different 
accounting systems. Third, as we have dis-
cussed above, many of the early studies have 
not been able to control adequately for the 
selection/endogeneity problem of ownership 
and their estimates of the effects of privatiza-
tion may hence be biased.
Since the studies are heterogeneous with 
respect to their methodologies, we classify 
all studies into those that (1) employ fixed 
effects or instrumental variables (IVs) to 
handle the selection/endogeneity  problem 
inherent in privatization and (2) do not 
tackle this problem and use OLS. Our clas-
sification has an important reason behind 
it. First, one can make the assumption that 
unobservable ownership effects, including 
those stemming from selection of firms for 
privatization or acquisition of firms by for-
eign owners, are typically correlated with the 
explanatory variables and error term in the 
model and do not change over time. In this 
case the bias arising from unobserved het-
erogeneity can be removed by estimating the 
fixed effects model. The fixed effects model 
contains an individual specific constant that 
captures all time-invariant (observed as well 
as unobserved) characteristics. The second 
assumption concerns the situation in which 
unobservable ownership effects vary over 
time. In this case it is necessary to employ 
estimation using instrumental variables to 
account for the selection/endogeneity prob-
lem inherent in privatization.13 The success 
of the IV estimation depends heavily on 
finding adequate instrumental variables that 
satisfy the exogeneity condition. As suitable 
instrumental variables are often difficult to 
obtain, the fixed effects estimation has been 
frequently used, especially in earlier studies.
In our evaluation, we use only estimates 
from the set of studies that employ fixed 
effects or IVs because they  are less likely 
to suffer from selection bias. In the case of 
privatization, private (especially foreign) 
owners are naturally interested in acquiring 
firms that have (at least potentially) supe-
rior performance. Hence, studies that do 
not account for selection may erroneously 
attribute potentially superior performance 
of privatized firms to the new owners rather 
than to the inherently superior performance 
of firms selected for privatization.
13 Alternatively, other suitable techniques such as dif-
ference in difference estimator and matching-type esti-
mator can be employed, provided that adequate data are 
available.
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In view of these issues, we consider four-
teen privatization studies covered by Djankov 
and Murrell that handle the selection/endo-
geneity problem and we add twenty studies 
that have been published or circulated as 
working papers by December 2007. We list 
these thirty-four studies, in table 2, together 
with information on their region and perfor-
mance indicator. 
In assessing the effects of privatization, 
we focus on TFP and TFP growth (figures 1 
and 2, respectively), profitability and growth 
in profitability (figures 3 and 4, respectively), 
and revenue level and growth in revenue 
(figures 5 and 6, respectively). We also dis-
cuss the main findings of studies dealing 
with labor productivity, employment, wages, 
and other indicators of performance (not 
reported in figures or tables). In the figures, 
we report separately results from studies 
dealing with CEE, including the Baltics 
and Balkans, and studies dealing with the 
CIS, which started the transition later and 
placed less emphasis on the development of 
a strong, market-oriented legal framework 
and  institutions. 14
As could be expected, even within each 
category of performance (e.g., TFP), the 
various studies employ a variety of measures 
(e.g., revenues, sales, or value added). Since 
there are very few studies that use a homog-
enous measure of performance, we have 
decided not to perform a meta-analysis—
combining coefficients and associated stan-
dard errors from various studies to obtain a 
single efficient estimate of the effect of priva-
tization on a given measure of performance. 
We have opted instead for a graphical pre-
sentation to synthesize results obtained from 
varying measures within a given category of 
14 For a more detailed discussion of the results of these 
studies, see Estrin et al. (2007), which contains detailed 
tables listing region, time period, performance measure, 
types of ownership, and resulting effects separately for 
each available study from CEE, the CIS, and China.
 performance. The graphical presentation in 
figures 1–6 therefore serves as a proxy for a 
meta-analysis. As stated earlier, in table 2 we 
list all the studies employed in the graphical 
analysis and indicate what performance mea-
sures they use. In the table, we also denote 
whether a study deals with data from CEE, 
the CIS, or both.
In constructing figures 1–6, we depart 
from earlier surveys by distinguishing 
between effects on the level of performance 
(capturing a one-shot permanent impact) 
and effects on growth (capturing effects on 
the rate of change in performance over time). 
In figures 1–6, we depict results for levels in 
panels A and results for growth in panels B. 
When summarizing the results, we divide 
the studies estimating the effect on level of 
performance into those that report relatively 
large effects (defined as more than 15 per-
cent), medium effects (5–15 percent), small 
effects (less than 5 percent), and results that 
are statistically insignificant at the 10 per-
cent test level. In terms of rate of growth, 
we divide the studies into those that report 
relatively large effects (more than 5 percent), 
medium effects (1–5 percent), small effects 
(less than 1 percent), and effects that are sta-
tistically insignificant at the 10 percent test 
level. 
We present the results graphically in the 
form of white, black, and half-white/half-
black circles. White circles denote effects 
of studies that cover the early-to-mid 1990s 
when privatization was not yet completed 
(the exact timeframe varies across countries). 
Black circles indicate that the data come from 
the mid-to-late 1990s onwards. Half-white/
half-black circles denote effects of studies 
that cover both the early and late transition 
period. As a general rule one circle repre-
sents result for one country. For this reason 
the number of circles exceeds the number of 
studies. The difference is due to the fact that 
some studies report results for more than 
one country or group or time period. Several 
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TABLE 2 
List of Surveyed Studies: Territorial Coverage and Performance Indicators
Author(s) TFP Profitability Sales and Revenues D–M
Andreyeva (2003) 2 2
Angelucci, Estrin, Konings, Zolkiewski (2002) 1 1
Brown and Earle (2001a) 2 Yes
Brown and Earle (2001b) 2 Yes
Brown, Earle and Telegdy (2006) 3
Carlin, Fries, Schaffer, Seabright (2001) 3 Yes
Claessens and Djankov (1999a) 1 Yes
Claessens and Djankov (1999b) 1
Claessens and Djankov (2002) 1
Claessens, Djankov and Pohl (1997) 1 Yes
Commander and Svejnar (forthcoming) 3
Djankov and Hoekman (2000) 1
Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (1999) 1 Yes
Frydman, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (2000) 1 Yes
Grigorian (1999) 1 Yes
Grosfeld and Tressel (2002) 1
Hanousek, Koc˘enda, and Svejnar (2007) 1 1
Hanousek and Koc˘enda (2003) 1
Jones and Mygind (2002) 1 Yes
Jones, Klinedinst and Rock (1998) 1 Yes
Maurel (2001) 1
Miller (2006) 1
Orazem and Vodopivec (2004) 1
Perevalov, Gimadii, and Dobrodey (2000) 2 2 Yes
Pivovarsky (2001) 2
Pivovarsky (2003) 2
Sabirianova, Svejnar, and Terrell (2005) 3
Salis (2005) 1 1
Simoneti, Damijan, Rojec, and Majcen (2005) 1
Smith, Cin, and Vodopivec (1997) 1 Yes
Simoneti and Gregoric (2004) 1 1
Weiss and Nikitin (2002) 1 1 Yes
Warzynski (2003) 2 Yes
Zalduendo (2003) 1
Notes: “1” denotes coverage of the CEE countries;  “2”  denotes coverage of the Russia and CIS region; “3” denotes 
combination of the coverage for CEE, Russia, and CIS. “Yes” in the D–M column indicates the study is covered by 
Djankov and Murell (2002).
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results from one study are translated into sev-
eral circles. There are also four studies that 
report the average effect across more than 
one country. These studies are not included 
in the figures but their effects are captured 
in the text.15
Since the effects of foreign and domestic 
private ownership are in important respects 
different, we present in separate columns 
estimated effects of privatization to foreign 
owners, domestic private owners, and private 
owners as whole (studies that do not sepa-
rate private owners’ domestic versus foreign 
status).
4.1  Total Factor Productivity
Productive efficiency, or total factor pro-
ductivity, is of major interest since the com-
munist economies collapsed in large part 
because they were increasingly unable to 
sustain innovation and technical progress. 
In particular, central planners were rela-
tively capable of mobilizing labor and capital 
resources through compulsory full employ-
ment and high rates of investment, but they 
had a hard time increasing the amount of 
output that SOEs generated from any given 
inputs. As a result, a major expectation 
 during the transition has been that firms 
would increase their TFP.
We have identified seventeen studies that 
control for selection/endogeneity and ana-
lyze the impact of ownership on TFP or rate 
of change of TFP, using value added, total 
product or sales revenues as the dependent 
variable and either dummy variables or per-
cent share ownership as measures of differ-
ent types of ownership.16 
As may be seen in figure 1, in CEE the 
overall effect of private relative to state 
15 This is case of Stijn Claessens and Djankov (1999b, 
2002), Wendy Carlin et al. (2001), and Simon Commander 
and Svejnar (forthcoming).
16 There are also five studies that estimate the TFP 
effect by OLS.
 ownership on the level of TFP is mostly pos-
itive during both periods. Moreover, studies 
that break private ownership into categories 
show that the overall private versus state 
ownership dichotomy subsumes differ-
ent private ownership effects. The studies 
almost uniformly suggest that privatization 
to foreign owners greatly increases efficiency. 
This effect of foreign ownership is strong and 
robust across regions. The effect of domestic 
private ownership is by and large also found 
positive in the CEE region, but it is quan-
titatively much smaller than that of foreign 
ownership (the quantitative effects are not 
fully discernible in the figure). Moreover, 
this effect is greater in the later than earlier 
transition period. In CIS, privatization to 
foreign owners yields a positive or insignifi-
cant effect while privatization to domestic 
owners generates a negative or insignificant 
effect. Studies that do not distinguish the 
national origin of the private owner pro-
duce a positive effect on TFP levels. In most 
instances, the estimated economic effect is 
smaller in the CIS than CEE. Overall, the 
TFP effect of privatization to domestic own-
ers is weaker than that to foreign owners, 
takes longer to take a hold, and in the CIS it 
has been outright negative or insignificant.
For comparative purposes, we have also 
surveyed the ownership-related studies that 
have been carried out on data from China. 
Probably because large-scale privatiza-
tion is a relatively recent phenomenon in 
China, there have not yet been any stud-
ies of great econometric sophistication and 
this may explain the patchy results. A num-
ber of studies, including Gary H. Jefferson, 
Thomas G. Rawski, and Yuxin Zheng (1996), 
address TFP issues with firm level data but 
do not examine differences in TFP related 
to privatization or ownership. Studies that 
address these issues (e.g., Yifan Hu, Frank 
Song, and Junxi Zhang 2004; Shahid Yusuf, 
Kaoru Nabeshima, and Dwight H. Perkins 
2006)) find diverse results, with the effect 
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of  nonstate ownership being mostly positive 
and often statistically significant.17
Compared to the Djankov–Murrell survey 
that finds the effect of private ownership to 
be positive in CEE but insignificant in  the 
CIS, we, hence, find a strong positive effect of 
foreign ownership in both the CEE and CIS 
regions and a quantitatively smaller positive 
effect of domestic private ownership in CEE 
and in Ukraine (together with a negative 
effect in Russia and the rest of the CIS). The 
reason for finding a stronger positive effect 
17 For a more detailed discussion of the results of these 
studies, see Estrin et al. (2007).
than Djankov–Murrell is in part because we 
are focusing on studies that take into account 
the problem of selection/endogeneity of own-
ership, whereas the earlier surveys did not 
place as much emphasis on this issue. Indeed, 
the unreported OLS studies, including those 
in China, generate much more diverse effects 
in terms of the estimated OLS coefficients. 
Another reason for our stronger and more 
uniform findings of positive effects of private 
ownership may be that more of our studies 
cover recent years and privatization may take 
several years to have an effect as strong own-
ers take control and markets start to function. 
Finally, institutional  development is a slow 











































Figure 1. Total Factor Productivity Level
Notes: White circles denote effects of studies that cover the early-to-mid 1990s period. Black circles denote 
effects of studies that cover the mid-to-late 1990s onwards. Half-white/half-black circles denote effects of 
studies covering both periods. One circle represents result for one country.
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process and more recent data may pertain to 
a more developed legal and institutional set-
ting in most of the transition economies. The 
variety of findings about the effects of non-
state ownership in China may also be related 
to the fact that privatization on a relatively 
large scale is a more recent phenomenon in 
China.
Several studies examine concentration of 
ownership and find that it plays an important 
part, with majority private ownership having 
mostly positive effects on TFP. The overall 
positive effect is again driven primarily by 
foreign owned firms. The effect of major-
ity domestic private ownership tends to be 
positive as well, but it tends to be smaller in 
magnitude. As before, the effect is found to 
be positive in Ukraine but negative in Russia. 
Overall, we hence find qualified support for 
the hypothesis that concentrated private 
ownership tends to increase efficiency more 
than dispersed ownership.
The existing privatization studies also pro-
vide information about the effect of employee 
(insider) ownership on efficiency. There has 
been a major debate about whether employee 
ownership and control are associated with 
lower or higher efficiency and excessive use of 
labor (labor hoarding).18 We have found seven 
studies that examine the effect of employee 
ownership on TFP. Six estimates from both 
CEE and the CIS countries are statistically 
insignificant and one (Estonia) shows a posi-
tive effect of employee ownership on TFP. 
These results are different from those of 
Djankov–Murrell who find the overall effect 
of employee ownership on performance to 
be insignificant in CEE and negative in CIS. 
One reason for this discrepancy may be the 
aforementioned limited overlap between our 
and Djankov–Murrell studies in this area. 
Moreover, Djankov and Murrell report that 
18 In addition to our discussion above, see Manuel 
Hinds (1991), John S. Earle and Estrin (1996), and Josef 
C. Brada (1996).
“the results for managers and workers show 
a considerable degree of sensitivity to how 
selection bias is handled,” while we focus 
on studies that handle the issue of selection. 
Finally, Djankov and Murrell recalculate 
some estimates (e.g., in their table 1) for the 
sake of comparability across studies, while we 
present the effects as reported in the original 
studies.
Two studies distinguish between priva-
tized SOEs and newly created private firms. 
Klara Z. Sabirianova, Svejnar, and Katherine 
Terrell (2005) use 1992–2000 firm-level data 
for almost all industrial firms in the Czech 
Republic and Russia and find that foreign 
start-ups are less efficient than existing for-
eign owned firms, but more efficient than 
domestic start-ups, which are in turn more 
efficient than existing domestic firms. This 
study, hence, suggests that new firms tend 
to be more efficient than firms privatized to 
domestic owners. Using 2002 and 2005 firm-
level data from twenty-six transition econo-
mies, Commander and Svejnar (forthcoming) 
find that domestic start up firms are less effi-
cient than foreign owned firms but not signif-
icantly different from domestic privatized or 
state-owned firms. The two studies, hence, 
suggest that de novo firms are more produc-
tive than or at least as productive as SOEs 
privatized to domestic owners.
As may be seen from figure 2, effects of 
privatization on TFP growth have been esti-
mated by country only in the CEE region. 
The results suggest that in CEE privatization 
had a positive effect on the rate of change of 
TFP in the early transition period and that 
the effect disappears in the later stage. The 
studies do not distinguish between domestic 
and foreign categories of private ownership. 
Commander and Svejnar (forthcoming) esti-
mate the effect of privatization to domestic 
and foreign owners on TFP growth on a sam-
ple of twenty-seven transition economies, 
thus combining CEE and CIS countries. 
Using data from 2002–05, they find the two 
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effects to be both statistically insignificant. 
It is, hence, possible that foreign owners 
brought about a sizable increase in efficiency 
in the period immediately after acquiring 
the local firms in the 1990s but that later on 
the rate of change in efficiency has been on 
average similar in all the principal types of 
ownership of firms.
4.2  Profitability
Profitability is an important indicator of 
company performance, although in the tran-
sition economies, as in many other develop-
ing countries, profits may be underreported 
by firms to evade taxes, and may reflect mar-
ket power as well as technical efficiency.
In figures 3 and 4, we summarize the 
effects of ownership on profitability from 
ten studies. Most studies pertain to CEE 
and show a small positive or insignificant 
effect of privatization to domestic or foreign 
owners on profitability levels in the early as 
well late transformation periods (figure 3). 
This is accompanied by insignificant effects 
of privatization to domestic and foreign 
owners on the rate of growth of profitability 
(figure 4).
A further analysis of this overall pattern 
indicates that the effect varies across types 
of ownership (bank, investment fund, indi-
vidual, etc.), with the positive effects in the 
case of foreign owners being brought about 
 











































Figure 2. Total Factor Productivity Growth
Notes: White circles denote effects of studies that cover the early-to-mid 1990s period. Black circles denote 
effects of studies that cover the mid-to-late 1990s onwards. Half-white/half-black circles denote effects of 
studies covering both periods. One circle represents result for one country.
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by industrial (nonfinancial) companies as 
owners, while in the case of domestic owners 
it is usually some form of financial ownership 
that generates positive effects on profit. In 
this finer categorization, however, the effects 
vary across studies. Interestingly, using data 
from the Czech Republic, Andrew Weiss and 
Georgiy Nikitin (2002) find a positive effect 
of national (state) ownership on the rate of 
change of both operating profit per worker 
and operating profit per unit of capital, as 
well as a positive effect of municipal own-
ership on the rate of change of operating 
profit per worker. Using data of the publicly 
traded firms in the Czech Republic during 
1993–95, Hanousek and Kocˇenda (2003) in 
turn find a positive effect of foreign majority 
ownership on the rate of change in returns 
on assets. Finally, Hanousek, Kocˇenda, and 
Svejnar (2007) find positive effect of the 
subsequent ownership by banks on change 
in ROA but this effect is offset by negative 
effect of change in ownership. Foreign indus-
trial owners exhibit positive effect of initial 
ownership on profit over sales, while effect 
of subsequent ownership by other foreign 
 owners is negative. Overall, profitability is 
not significantly affected by the state keep-
ing a golden share.
Three studies that control for endogene-
ity/selection examine the effect of owner-
ship concentration. In the Czech Republic, 













































Figure 3. Profitability Level
Notes: White circles denote effects of studies that cover the early-to-mid 1990s period. Black circles denote 
effects of studies that cover the mid-to-late 1990s onwards. Half-white/half-black circles denote effects of 
studies covering both periods. One circle represents result for one country.
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Hanousek, Kocˇenda, and Svejnar (2007) 
find no effect of concentration that results 
from the initial large scale privatization, but 
they find a positive effect of majority owner-
ship by domestic private owners as a result 
of ownership changes that took place after 
privatization. In terms of foreign ownership, 
the authors do not find any effect of high 
(majority) concentration among foreign own-
ers, but do find that strong (blocking) minor-
ity (33–49 percent) foreign ownership has 
a positive effect on return on assets. Jeffrey 
Miller (2006) finds the effect of concentrated 
ownership on return on assets to be posi-
tive in Bulgaria, while Marko Simoneti and 
Aleksandra Gregoric (2004) find  concentrated 
management (but not employees) ownership 
to have a positive effect on profit/sales in 
Slovenia. Hence, concentrated domestic pri-
vate ownership, managerial ownership, and 
to a lesser extent foreign ownership tend to 
have a positive effect on profitability, while 
state keeping a golden share or concentration 
of worker ownership appear to be unrelated 
to profitability.
Studies of the effects of ownership on 
profit of firms in China vary considerably in 
terms of their methodology, sample size and 
findings, and as yet only one uses sophisti-
cated econometric methods. Thus, Jefferson 
and Jian Su (2006) estimate  effect of private 
ownership on profit/sales to be positive but 
 
 











































Figure 4. Profitability Growth
Notes: White circles denote effects of studies that cover the early-to-mid 1990s period. Black circles denote 
effects of studies that cover the mid-to-late 1990s onwards. Half-white/half-black circles denote effects of 
studies covering both periods. One circle represents result for one country.
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significant only at the 10 percent test level. 
Other studies include Xiao-yuan Dong, 
Louis Putterman, and Bulent Unel (2006) 
who find the effect of state urban and private 
rural ownership to be positive, while that of 
state rural and private urban ownership to 
be negative. Several studies of China exam-
ine ownership concentration, with Ligang 
Song and Yang Yao (2004) finding that state 
and private majority ownership has a posi-
tive effect relative to nonmajority state and 
private ownership, with the latter not being 
significantly different from one another. Tian 
and Estrin (2008) in turn find that state hav-
ing small shareholding has the largest positive 
value on corporate value, followed by high 
state shareholding, while intermediate state 
shareholding has the lowest effect. Finally, 
Qian Sun and Wilson H. S.  Tong (2003) find 
that majority state or foreign ownership does 
not have a significant effect on the operating 
income/sales ratio.
In CEE, the CIS, and China, the effect of 
private foreign and domestic ownership on 
profitability is, hence, found to be positive or 
statistically insignificant, with the  significance 
depending on the particular type of owner-
ship. Concentrated domestic private owner-
ship, managerial ownership, and, to a lesser 
extent, foreign ownership generally tend to 
have a positive effect on  profitability, while 
evidence from CEE also suggests that prof-
itability is unaffected by whether or not the 
state keeps a golden share or workers wield a 
more concentrated ownership.
4.3  Revenues
In figures 5 and 6, we report the priva-
tization effects on revenues from fourteen 
studies. Since these studies do not control 
for input use, they effectively measure the 
effect of privatization on the scale of opera-
tion of the firm. In most studies carried out 
in CEE, there is a strong and positive effect 
of private ownership on the level of revenues 
(figure 5). The effect is detected in studies 
that cover either the more recent period or 
both the earlier and more recent periods. 
Studies that derive their estimates only from 
the early period generate small (less than 5 
percent). The positive effect is found with 
respect to both domestic and foreign private 
ownership, with foreign ownership appear-
ing to have greater positive effects. A simi-
larly strong positive effect is found in a study 
covering privatization in the early period in 
the CIS. However, two studies that cover the 
later transition period in the CIS find small 
positive and negative effects, respectively. 
The CIS studies do not distinguish between 
domestic and foreign ownership. 
In terms of revenue growth, we see in 
CEE a high positive effect of privatization 
to foreign owners in the early period and 
a small effect in the later period, and an 
insignificant effect of privatizing to domes-
tic owners. The one study that covers the 
CIS does not distinguish between domestic 
and foreign private ownership and suggests 
that the effect of privatization is statisti-
cally insignificant. The somewhat positive 
findings for foreign-owned firms may be 
brought about by their better access to for-
eign markets and possibly support from for-
eign headquarters. 
With respect to China, Jin Jia, Sun, and 
Tong (2005) find the effect of ownership 
on the rate of change of real sales to be 
insignificant, while Sun and Tong (2003) 
estimate this effect to be negative for state 
majority ownership, insignificant for foreign 
majority ownership, and positive for compa-
nies that are listed on the stock exchange.
Overall, the studies of CEE and CIS 
countries indicate that privatization tends to 
have a positive effect on the scale of opera-
tion, while studies of the effect of private 
ownership on the rate of change of scale of 
operations (from CEE, the CIS, and China) 
suggest that this effect is not statistically sig-
nificant except in some well defined catego-
ries of ownership.
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4.4  Labor Productivity
Estimates of the effect of ownership on 
labor productivity (not controlling for the 
use of others inputs) are based on twenty 
four studies. The results of these studies 
have a less clear-cut interpretation since 
differences across types of firms could be 
due to different efficiency or simply to dif-
ferent nonlabor (especially capital) factor 
intensity. For this reason, we do not present 
these results graphically. Nevertheless, it is 
reassuring that the findings of these studies 
are similar to the TFP results—they sug-
gest that the effect of private ownership is 
primarily positive or insignificant. Similarly, 
as in the case of TFP, foreign ownership and 
concentrated ownership are found to have 
a positive or insignificant effect, while the 
effects of employee and management owner-
ship are estimated to be mostly statistically 
insignificant. Finally, newly established firms 
are found to have lower labor productivity 
than others in some studies but not in oth-
ers, but this may be brought about by a scale 
effect. Government retention of a golden 
share (veto power over certain key decisions) 
appears to have an insignificant effect.
The corresponding studies of firms in 
China yield mostly insignificant estimates 
of the effects of private/nonstate ownership 
on labor productivity, with only one estimate 
 











































Figure 5. Revenue Level
Notes: White circles denote effects of studies that cover the early-to-mid 1990s period. Black circles denote 
effects of studies that cover the mid-to-late 1990s onwards. Half-white/half-black circles denote effects of 
studies covering both periods. One circle represents result for one country.
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being positive. Overall, the effects of all types 
of private ownership on labor productiv-
ity (not controlling for nonlabor inputs) are, 
hence, found to be positive or insignificant in 
CEE and the CIS, and mostly insignificant 
in China.
4.5  Employment
The effect of privatization on employment, 
like on revenues, is an indicator of the extent 
of restructuring brought about through 
privatization. As such, it provides an impor-
tant empirical link to the theoretical models 
of transition.
Seventeen studies have examined the effect 
of ownership on employment or rate of change 
of employment, with thirteen of them tack-
ling the issue of endogeneity/selection. The 
estimates indicate that there is a tendency for 
privatized firms, especially those with foreign 
owners, to increase or not to reduce employ-
ment relative to firms with state ownership, 
ceteris paribus, where the control variables 
usually but not always include output (sales) 
and/or output and input prices. This positive 
or insignificant employment effect is very dif-
ferent from the negative employment effect 
found in the Mexican privatized firms by 
Rafael La Porta and Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes (1999). 
In general, employee ownership and 
control do not have a significant effect on 











































Figure 6. Revenue Growth
Notes: White circles denote effects of studies that cover the early-to-mid 1990s period. Black circles denote 
effects of studies that cover the mid-to-late 1990s onwards. Half-white/half-black circles denote effects of 
studies covering both periods. One circle represents result for one country.
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employment, providing parallel evidence to 
the TFP studies that this form of ownership 
does not result in excess employment.
Using a large 1980–90 sample of firms in 
China, Julia Lane, Harry G. Broadman, and 
Inderjit Singh (1998) find a negative effect of 
the state and collective ownership on both 
job creation and job destruction. 
The studies of employment hence find 
that privatization in the post-communist 
economies and China is not associated with 
a reduction in employment, a phenomenon 
that is assumed in many theoretical models 
and which was documented in some develop-
ing countries (e.g., Mexico). On the contrary, 
private owners tend to keep employment at 
higher levels than SOEs, ceteris paribus.
4.6  Wages
Five studies of the effects of ownership on 
wages find that state ownership is associated 
with lower wages in some countries, such as 
Russia and former Czechoslovakia, but not 
in others, such as Poland. Daniel Munich, 
Svejnar and Terrell’s (2005) study of the 
Czech Republic suggests that there is no sig-
nificant difference in the rate of return on an 
additional year of education between state-
owned, privatized and newly established 
private firms, but that private firms reward 
university education more than SOEs.
In Russia, where in the 1990s firms tended 
to owe wages to their workers, SOEs were 
more likely to exhibit wage arrears than 
firms with domestic and foreign private own-
ership, firms with mixed ownership and de 
novo firms (Earle and Sabirianova 2002; 
Hartmut Lehmann, Jonathan Wadsworth, 
and Alessandro Acquisti 1999). Hence, dur-
ing this period, private ownership was asso-
ciated with a greater adherence to labor 
contracts than state ownership.
4.7  Other Indicators of Performance
At least thirty-five studies have analyzed 
the effect of ownership on other dependent 
variables. The following patterns of private 
ownership effects seem to be broadly sup-
ported by the data: (1) private ownership 
tends to result in higher exports and greater 
efficiency, as measured by the cost of inputs 
relative to sales, Tobin’s Q, and soft budget 
constraints, and (2) foreign firms tend to 
restructure and sell assets more than others 
(Djankov 1999), are more likely to pay divi-
dends (Jan Bena and Hanousek 2008), and 
are less likely to default on debt (Frydman, 
Marek Hessel, and Rapaczynski 2000). 
Despite the fact that the broad range of indi-
cators used in the studies precludes a unified 
summary, the results exhibit a pattern that is 
in line shown by other indicators.
5. Concluding Observations
The transformation of the former commu-
nist countries from almost completely state-
owned to mostly privately owned economies 
is one of the fundamental events in recent 
economic history. Given the relatively poor 
performance of the centrally planned econo-
mies before the transition, most academics 
and policymakers expected privatization to 
result in greatly improved economic perfor-
mance. As it turned out, the postcommunist 
countries went through a deep recession in 
the first three to eight years of the transi-
tion, a period that usually coincided with the 
launch of privatization. Yet, they have been 
among the fastest growing economies since 
then—in the last ten to fifteen years. In con-
trast, China did not lead its transition with 
large scale privatization and it avoided the 
transition recession observed in CEE and 
the CIS. However, it is relatively soon to draw 
strong conclusions from the Chinese experi-
ence with privatization, and there is a paucity 
of econometrically convincing studies at this 
stage. The evidence assembled in this study 
suggests that privatization and performance 
are related but that the relationship is more 
complicated than has been assumed.
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First, privatization to foreign owners is 
found to result in considerably improved per-
formance of firms virtually everywhere in the 
transition economies—an effect that is best 
characterized as a fairly rapid shift in perfor-
mance rather than a gradual improvement over 
an extended period of time. Second, the per-
formance effect of privatization to domestic 
owners has on average been less impressive 
and it has varied across regions. The effect 
has been smaller, often delayed, but positive 
in CEE; it has been nil or even negative in 
Russia and the rest of the CIS. This diver-
gence of findings between CEE and the CIS 
coincides with differences in policies and 
institutional development in the two regions, 
with the former increasingly adopting EU 
rules and joining the European Union, and 
the latter proceeding slower in introducing 
a market friendly legal and institutional sys-
tem. Third, in China the results to date are 
less clear cut and relatively more estimates 
suggest that privatization to domestic owners 
improves the level of performance, perhaps 
because of the benefits of the gradual reform 
process.
In-depth firm-level studies further suggest 
that concentrated (especially foreign) private 
ownership has a stronger positive effect on 
performance than dispersed ownership in 
CEE and the CIS, but foreign joint ventures 
rather than wholly owned foreign firms have 
a positive effect on the level of total factor 
productivity in China. Worker ownership 
in CEE and the CIS (collective ownership 
in China) does not seem to have a negative 
effect. Data from CEE and the CIS suggest 
that new firms are equally or more efficient 
than firms privatized to domestic owners, and 
foreign start-ups appear to be more efficient 
than domestic ones. Interestingly, contrary to 
assumptions of many theoretical models, as 
well as evidence from some developing coun-
tries (e.g., Mexico), privatization in the post-
communist economies is not associated with 
a reduction in employment. On the contrary, 
private owners tend to keep employment at 
higher levels than state-owned firms, ceteris 
paribus. Finally, macro studies are consis-
tent with micro analyses in that they suggest 
that privatization, especially when accompa-
nied by complementary reforms, may have 
a  positive effect on the level of aggregate 
output or economic growth. An important 
issue that remains unresolved is whether 
speed of privatization, and the accompa-
nying  dispersed versus more concentrated 
ownership, has a positive or negative effect 
on aggregate output and growth.
In view of the above results, the ques-
tion naturally arises as to why the effect of 
privatization in CEE and the CIS has been 
smaller in the case of domestic than foreign 
private owners. Discussions with manag-
ers, policymakers and analysts suggest three 
leading explanations. The finding may reflect 
in part the limited skills and access to world 
markets on the part of the local managers. 
Domestically owned privatized firms are also 
the ones where performance-reducing activi-
ties such as looting, tunneling and defrauding 
of minority shareholders have been most fre-
quent. Finally, in a number of countries the 
nature of the privatization process initially 
prevented large domestic private owners 
from obtaining 100 percent ownership stakes 
and insiders or the state often owned sizeable 
holdings (see Hanousek and Kocˇenda 2008). 
It frequently took these large shareholders 
several years to squeeze out minority share-
holders and in the process the large share-
holders sometimes artificially decreased the 
performance of their newly acquired firms in 
order to squeeze out the minority sharehold-
ers at low share prices.
The results highlight the importance of 
good management and corporate governance, 
access to world markets, and the presence of 
a functioning legal and institutional frame-
work. For the former state-owned firms, 
restructuring is most easily and effectively 
achieved by foreign ownership. Foreign firms 
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routinely bring in capable expatriate manag-
ers and invest heavily in training local man-
agers. They sell products through their global 
distributional networks, introduce a relatively 
advanced system of corporate governance 
and stress the importance of business ethics. 
Corporate governance of foreign firms hence 
compensates to a considerable extent for the 
underdeveloped legal and institutional sys-
tem in many transition economies. While 
some domestic firms have also developed 
good corporate governance, the underdevel-
oped legal system has allowed local manag-
ers (or block shareholders) in many privatized 
firms to maximize their own benefits at 
the expense of corporate performance and 
hence welfare of (other) shareholders as well 
as stakeholders such as workers and govern-
ment treasury. This is likely to account for the 
limited positive performance effects of priva-
tization to domestic private owners as com-
pared to the performance of firms privatized 
to foreign investors. Interestingly, in China, 
the constraints imposed by the government 
on foreign firms, together with a relatively 
functioning legal system, have diminished 
the difference between the performance of 
private domestic and foreign firms and made 
domestic–foreign joint ventures the most 
productive form of corporate ownership.
The most important policy implication of 
our survey is that privatization per se does 
not guarantee improved performance, at least 
not in the short to medium run. Type of pri-
vate ownership, corporate governance, access 
to know-how and markets, and the legal and 
institutional system matter for firm restruc-
turing and performance. Foreign ownership 
tends to have a positive effect on perfor-
mance. The positive effect of privatization to 
domestic owners, to the extent that it exists, 
takes a number of years to materialize. 
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